EU agrees on new ground-breaking rules to end anonymous companies, but falls short on trusts

Publicly revealing the real owners behind EU companies will help stop anonymous companies acting as the ‘getaway cars’ for corruption, tax evasion, drug trafficking and arms trading. The European Parliament should be congratulated for pushing for an ambitious deal in the face of opposition from …

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Re: [FD] [oss-security] CVE-2017-17670: vlc: type conversion vulnerability

Nice job! By the way, when is back-porting of the fix to the current stable version(s) envisioned? (I doubt most oss OS distributions use the “HEAD of the VLC master branch”, nor that most Windows or Mac users use the latest bleeding-edge build, leaving a potentially large window for exploitation if former versions don’t get fixed; knowing VLC’s popularity, I think that the question should be seriously considered) And is there a standalone patch or workaround that could be used for older versions (besides not opening mp4 videos anymore)? >

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[FD] SSD Advisory – vBulletin cacheTemplates Unauthenticated Remote Arbitrary File Deletion

SSD Advisory – vBulletin cacheTemplates Unauthenticated Remote Arbitrary File Deletion Full report: http://ift.tt/2nVEhyp Twitter: @SecuriTeam_SSD Weibo: SecuriTeam_SSD Vulnerability Summary The following advisory describes a unauthenticated deserialization vulnerability that leads to arbitrary delete files and, under certain circumstances, code execution found in vBulletin version 5. vBulletin, also known as vB, is “a widespread proprietary Internet forum software package developed by vBulletin Solutions, Inc., based on PHP and MySQL database server. vBulletin powers many of the largest social sites on the web, with over 100,000 sites built on it, including Fortune 500 and Alexa Top 1M companies websites and forums. According to the latest W3Techs1 statistics, vBulletin version 4 holds more than 55% of the vBulletin market share, while version 3 and 5 divide the remaining percentage”. Credit A security researcher from, TRUEL IT ( @truel_it ), has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program. Vendor response We tried to contact vBulletin since November 21 2017, repeated attempts to establish contact went unanswered. At this time there is no solution or workaround for these vulnerabilities. Vulnerability details Unsafe usage of PHP’s unserialize() on user-supplied input allows an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary files and, under certain circumstances, execute arbitrary code on a vBulletin installation. vB_Library_Template’s cacheTemplates() function, which is an publicly exposed API which allows to fetch information on a set of given templates from the database in order to store them inside a cache variable. File core/vb/api/template.php – function cacheTemplates(): === public function cacheTemplates($templates, $templateidlist, $skip_bbcode_style = false, $force_set = false) { return vB_Library::instance(‘template’)->cacheTemplates($templates, $templateidlist, $skip_bbcode_style, $for === Let’s take a look at $templateidlist – core/vb/library/template.php – function cacheTemplates(): === public function cacheTemplates($templates, $templateidlist, $skip_bbcode_style = false, $force_set = false) { $vboptions = vB::getDatastore() // vB_Library_Style::switchCssStyle() may pass us a templateidlist that’s already unserialized. if (!is_array($templateidlist)) { $templateidlist = unserialize($templateidlist); } foreach ($templates AS $template) { if (isset($templateidlist[$template])) { $templateids[] = intval($templateidlist[$template]); } } if (!empty($templateids)) { $temps = vB::getDbAssertor(array(‘title’, ‘textonly’, ‘template_un’, ‘template’)); // cache templates foreach ($temps as $temp) { if (empty(self::$templatecache[“$temp[title]”]) OR $force_set) { self::$templatecache[“$temp[title]”] = $this; } } } if (!$skip_bbcode_style) { self::$bbcode_style = array( ‘code’ => &$templateassoc[‘bbcode_code_styleid’], ‘html’ => &$templateassoc[‘bbcode_html_styleid’], ‘php’ => &$templateassoc[‘bbcode_php_styleid’], ‘quote’ => &$templateassoc[‘bbcode_quote_styleid’] ); } } === $temnplateidlist variable, which can come directly from user-input, is directly supplied to unserialize(), resulting in an arbitrary deserialization primitive.

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[FD] SSD Advisory – vBulletin routestring Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

SSD Advisory – vBulletin routestring Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution Full report: http://ift.tt/2nVEhyp Twitter: @SecuriTeam_SSD Weibo: SecuriTeam_SSD Vulnerability Summary The following advisory describes a unauthenticated file inclusion vulnerability that leads to remote code execution found in vBulletin version 5. vBulletin, also known as vB, is a widespread proprietary Internet forum software package developed by vBulletin Solutions, Inc., based on PHP and MySQL database server. vBulletin powers many of the largest social sites on the web, with over 100,000 sites built on it, including Fortune 500 and Alexa Top 1M companies websites and forums. According to the latest W3Techs1 statistics, vBulletin version 4 holds more than 55% of the vBulletin market share, while version 3 and 5 divide the remaining percentage Credit An independent security researcher has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program Vendor response We tried to contact vBulletin since November 21 2017, repeated attempts to establish contact went unanswered. At this time there is no solution or workaround for these vulnerabilities. Vulnerability details vBulletin contains a vulnerability that can allow a remote attacker to include any file from the vBulletin server and execute arbitrary PHP code. An unauthenticated user is able to send a GET request to /index.php which can then trigger the file inclusion vulnerability with parameter routestring=. The request allows an attacker to create a crafted request to Vbulletin server installed on Windows OS and include any file on the web server. Listing of /index.php: === /* 48 */ $app = vB5_Frontend_Application::init(‘config.php’); /* 49 */ //todo, move this back so we can catch notices in the startup code. For now, we can set the value in the php.ini /* 50 */ //file to catch these situations. /* 51 */ // We report all errors here because we have to make Application Notice free /* 52 */ error_reporting(E_ALL | E_STRICT); /* 53 */ /* 54 */ $config = vB5_Config::instance(); /* 55 */ if (!$config->report_all_php_errors) { /* 56 */ // Note that E_STRICT became part of E_ALL in PHP 5.4 /* 57 */ error_reporting(E_ALL & ~(E_NOTICE | E_STRICT)); /* 58 */ } /* 59 */ /* 60 */ $routing = $app->getRouter(); /* 61 */ $method = $routing->getAction(); /* 62 */ $template = $routing->getTemplate(); /* 63 */ $class = $routing->getControllerClass(); /* 64 */ /* 65 */ if (!class_exists($class)) /* 66 */ { /* 67 */ // @todo – this needs a proper error message /* 68 */ die(“Couldn’t find controller file for $class”); /* 69 */ } /* 70 */ /* 71 */ vB5_Frontend_ExplainQueries::initialize(); /* 72 */ $c = new $class($template); /* 73 */ /* 74 */ call_user_func_array(array(&$c, $method), $routing->getArguments()); /* 75 */ /* 76 */ vB5_Frontend_ExplainQueries::finish(); === Let’s take a closer look on vB5_Frontend_Application::init() – Listing of /includes/vb5/frontend/application.php: === /* 15 */ public static function init($configFile) /* 16 */ { /* 17 */ parent::init($configFile); /* 18 */ /* 19 */ self::$instance = new vB5_Frontend_Application(); /* 20 */ self::$instance->router = new vB5_Frontend_Routing(); /* 21 */ self::$instance->router->setRoutes(); /* … */ === We can see that setRoutes() is called: Listing of /includes/vb5/frontend/routing.php: === /* 47 */ public function setRoutes() /* 48 */ { /* 49 */ $this->processQueryString(); /* 50 */ /* 51 */ //TODO: this is a very basic and straight forward way of parsing the URI, we need to improve it /* 52 */ //$path = isset($_SERVER[‘PATH_INFO’]) ? $_SERVER[‘PATH_INFO’] : ”; /* 53 */ /* 54 */ if (isset($_GET[‘routestring’])) /* 55 */ { /* 56 */ $path = $_GET[‘routestring’]; /* … */ /* 73 */ } /* 74 */ /* 75 */ if (strlen($path) AND $path{0} == ‘/’) /* 76 */ { /* 77 */ $path = substr($path, 1); /* 78 */ } /* 79 */ /* 80 */ //If there is an invalid image, js, or css request we wind up here. We can’t process any of them /* 81 */ if (strlen($path) > 2 ) /* 82 */ { /* 83 */ $ext = strtolower(substr($path, -4)) ; /* 84 */ if (($ext == /* 47 */ public function setRoutes() /* 48 */ { /* 49 */ $this->processQueryString(); /* 50 */ /* 51 */ //TODO: this is a very basic and straight forward way of parsing the URI, we need to improve it /* 52 */ //$path = isset($_SERVER[‘PATH_INFO’]) ? $_SERVER[‘PATH_INFO’] : ”; /* 53 */ /* 54 */ if (isset($_GET[‘routestring’])) /* 55 */ { /* 56 */ $path = $_GET[‘routestring’]; /* … */ /* 73 */ } /* 74 */ /* 75 */ if (strlen($path) AND $path{0} == ‘/’) /* 76 */ { /* 77 */ $path = substr($path, 1); /* 78 */ } /* 79 */ /* 80 */ //If there is an invalid image, js, or css request we wind up here. We can’t process any of them /* 81 */ if (strlen($path) > 2 ) /* 82 */ { /* 83 */ $ext = strtolower(substr($path, -4)) ; /* 84 */ if (($ext == ‘.gif’) OR ($ext == ‘.png’) OR ($ext == ‘.jpg’) OR ($ext == ‘.css’) /* 85 */ OR (strtolower(substr($path, -3)) == ‘.js’) ) /* 86 */ { /* 87 */ header(“HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found”); /* 88 */ die(”); /* 89 */ } /* 90 */ } /* 91 */ /* 92 */ try /* 93 */ { /* 94 */ $message = ”; // Start with no error. /* 95 */ $route = Api_InterfaceAbstract::instance()->callApi(‘route’, ‘getRoute’, array(‘pathInfo’ => $path, ‘queryString’ => $_SERVER[‘QUERY_STRING’])); /* 96 */ } /* 97 */ catch (Exception $e) /* 98 */ { /* … */ /* 106 */ } /* … */ /* 127 */ if (!empty($route)) /* 128 */ { /* … */ /* 188 */ } /* 189 */ else /* 190 */ { /* 191 */ // if no route was matched, try to parse route as /controller/method /* 192 */ $stripped_path = preg_replace(‘/[^a-z0-9\/-_.]+/i’, ”, trim(strval($path), ‘/’)); /* … */ /* 229 */ } /* 230 */ /* 231 */ //this could be a legacy file that we need to proxy. The relay controller will handle /* 232 */ //cases where this is not a valid file. Only handle files in the “root directory”. We’ll /* 233 */ //handle deeper paths via more standard routes. /* 234 */ if (strpos($path, ‘/’) === false) /* 235 */ { /* 236 */ $this->controller = ‘relay’; /* 237 */ $this->action = ‘legacy’; /* 238 */ $this->template = ”; /* 239 */ $this->arguments = array($path); /* 240 */ $this->queryParameters = array(); /* 241 */ return; /* 242 */ } /* 243 */ /* 244 */ vB5_ApplicationAbstract::checkState(); /* 245 */ /* 246 */ throw new vB5_Exception_404(“invalid_page_url”); /* 247 */ } ) ) /* 86 */ { /* 87 */ header(“HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found”); /* 88 */ die(”); /* 89 */ } /* 90 */ } /* 92 */ try /* 93 */ { /* 94 */ $message = ”; // Start with no error. /* 95 */ $route = Api_InterfaceAbstract::instance()->callApi(‘route’, ‘getRoute’, array(‘pathInfo’ => $path, ‘queryString’ => $_SERVER[‘QUERY_STRING’])); /* 96 */ } /* 97 */ catch (Exception $e) /* 98 */ { /* … */ /* 106 */ } /* … */ /* 127 */ if (!empty($route)) /* 128 */ { /* … */ /* 188 */ } /* 189 */ else /* 190 */ { /* 191 */ // if no route was matched, try to parse route as /controller/method /* 192 */ $stripped_path = preg_replace(‘/[^a-z0-9\/-_.]+/i’, ”, trim(strval($path), ‘/’)); /* … */ /* 229 */ } /* 230 */ /* 231 */ //this could be a legacy file that we need to proxy. The relay controller will handle /* 232 */ //cases where this is not a valid file. Only handle files in the “root directory”. We’ll /* 233 */ //handle deeper paths via more standard routes. /* 234 */ if (strpos($path, ‘/’) === false) /* 235 */ { /* 236 */ $this->controller = ‘relay’; /* 237 */ $this->action = ‘legacy’; /* 238 */ $this->template = ”; /* 239 */ $this->arguments = array($path); /* 240 */ $this->queryParameters = array(); /* 241 */ return; /* 242 */ } /* … */ === So if our routestring does not end with ‘.gif’, ‘.png’, ‘.jpg’, ‘.css’ or ‘.js’ and does not contain ‘/’ char vBulletin will call legacy() method from vB5_Frontend_Controller_Relay – /includes/vb5/frontend/controller/relay.php: === /* 63 */ public function legacy($file) /* 64 */ { /* 65 */ $api = Api_InterfaceAbstract::instance(); /* 66 */ $api->relay($file); /* 67 */ } === If we will check relay() from Api_Interface_Collapsed class – /include/api/interface/collapsed.php: === /* 117 */ public function relay($file) /* 118 */ { /* 119 */ $filePath = vB5_Config::instance()->core_path . ‘/’ . $file; /* 120 */ /* 121 */ if ($file AND file_exists($filePath)) /* 122 */ { /* 123 */ //hack because the admincp/modcp files won’t return so the remaining processing in /* 124 */ //index.php won’t take place. If we better integrate the admincp into the /* 125 */ //frontend, we can (and should) remove this. /* 126 */ vB_Shutdown::instance()->add(array(‘vB5_Frontend_ExplainQueries’, ‘finish’)); /* 127 */ require_once($filePath); /* 128 */ } /* … */ === As we could see an attacker is not able to use ‘/’ in the $file so he cannot change current directory on Linux. But for Windows he can use ‘\’ as path delimiter and is able to specify any desired file (he can use ‘\..\’ trick as well) and it will be included by php. If we want to include file with extension like ‘.gif’, ‘.png’, ‘.jpg’, ‘.css’ or ‘.js’ we will need to bypass the mentioned check in setRoutes() method. This can be easily done by adding dot (‘.’) or space (‘%20’) to the filename.

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